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Abstract: Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available 
to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, 
especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory 
broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to 
group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from non-kin). To better 
understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ‘Collective Investment’ game, 
which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the 
level of relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating 
relatedness (genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba 
Dictyostelium discoideum, which builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. Measurements of 
stalk investment by natural strains correspond to the predicted patterns of relatedness-
dependent strategic investment, wherein investment by a strain increases with its relatedness 
to the group. Furthermore, if overall group relatedness is relatively low (i.e., no strain is at high 
frequency in a group) strains face a scenario akin to the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and suffer from 
insufficient collective investment. We find that strains employ relatedness-dependent 
segregation to avoid these pernicious conditions. These findings demonstrate that simple 
organisms like D. discoideum are not restricted to being ‘cheaters’ or ‘cooperators’, but instead 
measure their relatedness to their group and strategically modulate their investment into 
cooperation accordingly. Consequently, all individuals will sometimes appear to cooperate and 
sometimes cheat due to the dynamics of strategic investing.  
 
Significance statement: Contributing to cooperation is costly, while its rewards are often 
available to all members of a social group. Therefore, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation 
by individuals that do not contribute, but nevertheless share the benefits. So why contribute to 
cooperation? This dilemma can be resolved if individuals modulate their ‘investment’ into 
cooperation dependent on whether benefits go to relatives or nonrelatives, which maximizes 
the return on investment to their genes. To evaluate this idea, we derived a model for 
cooperative investment and tested its predictions using a social microbe that cooperatively 
builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. We find that cooperative investment into stalk closely 
matches predictions, with strains strategically adjusting investment according to their 
relatedness to their group. 
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Cooperation is widespread in nature (1–3), often being manifested as 
individuals investing in the production of public goods that benefit all members of a 
group (4–6). However, these goods are vulnerable to exploitation by ‘cheaters’ (or ‘free 
riders’) that reap the benefits of cooperation without commensurate investment (7, 8). 
Because such behavior has the potential to undermine the evolutionary stability of 
cooperation through public good production, successful cooperation is typically 
thought to require mechanisms of cheater avoidance or control (1, 9–11). This logic 
implies a simple evolutionary scenario where there is competition between alternative 
‘cooperator’ and ‘cheater’ strategies. However, it is logical to assume that such 
discrete strategies would lose out to individuals that can strategically modify their 
contribution to public goods. This is because strategic investment could allow 
individuals to balance the costs and benefits of ‘investing’, whilst realizing potential 
opportunities to exploit the investments made by others (12, 13). Because these costs 
and benefits can vary across social settings, individuals face a strategic dilemma over 
how much to invest, with the realized success of a strategy depending not only on the 
level of cooperative investments made by the individual, but also that made by others 
in the group.  
Kin selection theory provides an appealing framework for understanding how 
evolution shapes investment in cooperation. In this framework, the competing 
‘individuals’ are different genetic variants (14–16), with strategies evolving to maximize 
‘inclusive fitness’ (17, 18). The inclusive fitness accounting considers the total impact 
of a behavior on the success of the causal genes in terms of the direct costs to the 
actor and indirect benefits to relatives (i.e., others carrying that same genetic variant). 
For cooperation through production of public goods, where all benefits go to the entire 
group, relatedness to the group should be a critical determinant of inclusive fitness 
because it governs the share of rewards that go to the individual, and hence 
determines the expected net return on investment. Consequently, we would logically 
expect that individuals should optimize their inclusive fitness by facultatively 
modulating their willingness to invest into public goods as a function of their 
relatedness to the members of the group (4, 19–21).  
A number of theoretical studies have analyzed facultative cooperative 
strategies, where individuals modulate their behavior in response to social context 
(such as the behaviors shown by rivals) (22, 23). While most of these studies have 
focused on discrete alternative strategies (‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’) (12, 22), there is also 
a growing literature that considers continuously variable strategic cooperative 
behavior in response to social contexts, including relatedness (4, 23). However, 
experimental tests of theoretical predictions often either rely on the simpler models 
that do not include such potential complexity (24–28) or do not evaluate whether the 
observed facultative patterns are strategic (i.e., match adaptive quantitative 
predictions from evolutionary models) (29–34). For example, the opportunistic 
pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa facultatively produces iron-scavenging 
siderophores, which represent a cooperative public good (35–37). Cells produce 
quorum-sensing molecules that that allow them to modulate their production of 
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siderophores. There is evidence that investment into siderophore production is flexible 
(35, 36) and varies between broad-scale differences of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ relatedness 
(37). However, it is unclear as to whether the level of production can be varied 
quantitatively as a strategic response to fine-grained variation in relatedness.  
To understand how selection shapes patterns of investment into public goods 
in response to variation in relatedness, we therefore first developed a dynamic game-
theoretical framework that views competing genetic variants as players who can 
modulate their contributions to public goods based on their relatedness to their group. 
The resulting ‘Collective Investment’ game offers an intuitive economic logic for why 
and how organisms should modulate their contributions to public goods and provides 
a set of simple and unambiguous predictions that can be tested empirically. To directly 
test these predictions, we next examined the consequences of experimentally 
manipulating social group composition in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum 
on patterns of individual and collective investment in cooperation. These studies 
revealed a remarkable agreement between patterns of individual and collective 
investment with fine-scale model predictions, where patterns of cooperation are 
explained by savvy investment strategies that maximize the fitness return on 
investment.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Collective Investment Game 
When individuals engage in social interactions, their success typically depends 
on both their own behavior and the behavior of their social partner(s). Under these 
conditions, game theory provides a powerful framework for identifying how individuals 
should behave to maximize their expected social success across encounters (16, 38–
40). Game theoretical models predict that individuals will display the evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS), which cannot be invaded by any competing strategy (16, 39). 
In most economic and biological scenarios that involve cooperation, we might logically 
expect that individuals could do better by playing dynamic strategies in which they 
change their behavior quantitatively across different social contexts (3, 13). While 
games with fixed alternative strategies (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma) have been 
widely used as the basis for analyses of strategic modulation of cooperative behavior 
(4, 23), they do not yield any quantitative predictions about continuously variable 
behavior. Instead, models that consider cooperation via public goods (4, 23, 41, 42), 
typically based on the inclusive fitness framework (20, 43, 44), have proven more 
informative. We extent this work by developing a model based on an equivalent ‘direct 
fitness’ accounting, where different genetic variants are the players in a dynamic 
game, to provide an intuitive logic for the costs and benefits of investing in pubic goods.  
The game is described with two players, but logically extends to include more.  
The Collective Investment game is based on a scenario in which the payoff to 
a player is determined by two opposing factors: the costs suffered from investing in 
the public good and the resulting benefits from public good availability (Figure 1A).  
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Figure 1. The costs and benefits of cooperation through production of public goods. A) The benefit (relative payoff) from 
public good production is an increasing function of the resources invested into the public good (blue line). Because 
investment is costly it results in a decreasing payoff through other components (red line). In the case of the D. discoideum 
system, the benefits of stalk investment come through spore dispersal and come at a cost in terms of reduced spore 
production. B) The costs and benefits of investment in the public good result in a quadratic relationship between total 
investment ሺீܫ ሻ and overall group success (߱ீ). Groups have their highest success at some intermediate level of investment (Θୋ) that balances costs and benefits. In both A and B, investment in public good is given as the proportion of the total budget available, with zero being no investment and 1 corresponding to investment of all available budget into the public 
good. In the case of the D. discoideum system, this represents the proportion of cells that a strain invests into stalk 
production. For illustration, the optimal level of investment (Θୋ) resulting from the relative costs and benefits is 0.3. To 
capture different strengths of selection on investment (, see equation 5), the bold lines were plotted for a strength of 
selection where  = 2, with the shaded region indicating the range from  = 1 to 4. 
From the perspective of the group, this antagonistic relationship between costs 
and benefits results in a scenario where group success is maximized at some 
intermediate level of collective investment whenever public good production is favored 
by natural selection (Figure 1B). Examples of this sort of scenario, where overall 
success is maximized at an intermediate level of investment, are well documented, 
ranging from economics to biology (23, 45–47). However, the level of collective 
investment that maximizes group success (denoted Θୋ in the model) will typically differ 
from the level of personal investment that maximizes individual fitness (10). This is 
because individuals suffer the cost of investment, yet their payoffs are divided among 
the collective. Therefore, we expect individuals to implement selfish strategies that 
maximize their return on investment in terms of fitness, which must balance their 
personal costs with the return they receive through their influence on collective 
success (7, 13). The relative magnitude of the costs and benefits together define the 
strength of selection (denoted  in the model), which reflects the rate at which group 
success declines as investment deviates from the level that maximizes group success 
(i.e., deviates from Θୋ). 
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Figure 2. Examples of the predictions of the Collective Investment game (and specific application to the D. discoideum 
system). Predictions are plotted as a function of a focal player’s relatedness to the group (i.e. a strain’s frequency in the 
group). For parts A-C the optimal investment (Θୋ) was fixed at 0.3 and the strength of selection () was varied, while for D-F the strength of selection was fixed at 2 and the optimum was varied. A & D) Predicted Investment	ሺܫ௜∣௣೔) in the public good (stalk investment) as a function of relatedness (frequency). B & E) Predicted relative payoff (fitness) (ߩ௜) as a function of relatedness (frequency). C & F) Predicted collective investment ሺீܫ ሻ for a pair of players as a function of the relatedness 
(frequency) of the focal player to the group. (See SI Appendix, Figure S1 for illustrations across other parameter values).
To implement our direct fitness accounting, we consider a player to represent 
some proportion of the group, which is equivalent to the frequency of that genetic 
variant within the group (and therefore can vary between 0 and 1) and represents their 
‘whole-group relatedness’ (20, 21) (in economic terms, this might be described as a 
player’s ‘stake’ in the group). This measure of relatedness is relevant because, as the 
benefits of public goods are accessible to all group members, the whole-group is the 
beneficiary of investment made by an individual, and hence whole-group relatedness 
accounts for direct fitness return from investing in public goods. Despite differing from 
the more typical ‘kinship’ coefficient of inclusive fitness models, the two approaches 
produce exactly equivalent results (20, 21, 43). To identify the strategy that maximizes 
expected individual fitness, which represents the ESS for the game, we solved the 
Collective Investment game across the full range of relatedness over a broad array of 
relative costs and benefits of investment in public goods. These analyses revealed a 
general qualitative prediction for patterns of investment under the ESS: individuals 
should modulate their investment into public goods as a continuous function of their 
relatedness to the group. By evaluating the patterns predicted by the model across an 
enormous range of values for the optimal level of collective investment (i.e., the value 
that maximizes group success, Θୋ) and the strength of selection on investment (), it 
is clear that the qualitative results are robust across a wide array of conditions (Figure 
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2A and 2D; see also SI Appendix, Figure S1A S1D, S1G and S1J). When there is a 
relatively large asymmetry in the degree to which players are related to the group, 
each player should behave differently. The player with higher relatedness to the group 
has the incentive to invest because their interests are more closely aligned with those 
of the group (and hence investing maximizes their fitness, see SI Appendix, Figure 
S2), while the player(s) that is less related to the group does best by withholding 
investment (or under-investing) and exploiting the investment of their partner (SI 
Appendix, Figure S2). Consequently, under these conditions, the player with the lower 
relatedness will have higher relative fitness than the player with higher relatedness 
because of this exploitative behavior (Figure 2B and 2E, see also SI Appendix, Figure 
S1B, S1E, S1H and S1K). In contrast, when the players have similar levels of 
relatedness to the group, neither is expected to be willing to invest heavily, leading to 
a pattern of under-investment in the public good (Figure 2C and 2F; see also SI 
Appendix, Figure S1C, S1F, S1I and S1L). 
Figure 3. Illustration of the predictions of the Collective Investment game for the case where players make errors when 
measuring their relatedness. This corresponds to the scenario where players have imperfect information about their 
relatedness and are estimating their relatedness from some cues. The structure of the figure matches that of Figure 2. In all 
figures the optimal level of investment (Θୋ) is 0.3 and the strength of selection () is 2. Lines within each figure correspond 
to different values of error () in measurement of relatedness (frequency in the group) (see SI Appendix, Figure S4 for 
illustrations across other parameter values). 
 Because organisms in nature presumably rely on some cue(s) to measure their 
level of relatedness to the group (which would represent a mechanism of kin 
discrimination), we also evaluated how the patterns would be affected if individuals 
make errors when measuring relatedness (with the patterns in Figure 2 and S1 
illustrating the scenario of no measurement error). We included measurement error in 
the model by integrating over a Gaussian distribution centered on the true relatedness 
(allowing us to vary the degree of error by modulating the standard deviation of the 
error distribution, SI Appendix, Figure S3). We further assumed that measurement 
error depends on group complexity, and so is high at intermediate levels of relatedness 
(where group composition is the most complex), and low when one player has very 
high relatedness to the group. This extension of the model provides us with a robust 
and clear set of predictions for what to expect in nature (see Figure 3 for an example 
and SI Appendix, Figure S4 for illustrations across parameter space). Together, the 
Collective Investment game reveals that although the exact patterns will depend on 
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the relative costs and benefits of public good production (which will determine the 
optimal level of investment and the relative strength of selection on investment 
patterns) and the degree of error in measurement of relatedness, the qualitative 
patterns of individual investment, relative fitness, and collective investment are 
consistent across parameter space (see also SI Appendix, Figure S2B for an 
illustration of absolute fitness).  
 
Individual and Collective Investment in D. discoideum 
 To test whether organisms are able to deploy the relatedness-dependent (and 
hence frequency-dependent) strategies predicted by the Collective Investment game, 
we measured patterns of investment into a public good in the social amoeba D. 
discoideum. Free-living D. discoideum amoebae initiate a social cycle in response to 
starvation (48, 49). Thousands of amoebae aggregate to form a multicellular fruiting 
body with a supporting stalk composed of dead cells that holds aloft a sporehead. The 
stalk structure is thought to have evolved to aid spore dispersal, and it has been shown 
experimentally that an intact fruiting body does indeed increase dispersal (although 
dispersal is not eliminated by stalk removal) (50). Stalk cell differentiation has typically 
been viewed as altruistic self-sacrifice for the benefit of the cells in the sporehead (49, 
51–53). However, this perspective ignores the implications of collective investment on 
the group’s success: if a genotype only produced altruists then there would be no 
spores to reap the benefits of stalk investment and likewise, if a genotype only 
produced spores then they would be unable to reap group benefits of producing a stalk 
(Figure 1A). Consequently, there must be some intermediate level of stalk investment 
that is favored by natural selection that balances these costs and benefits (Figure 1B). 
Indeed, laboratory measurements reveal that typically 25-35% of cells are allocated to 
the stalk cell fate (54, 55).  
Multicellular aggregations can also be composed of multiple strains (i.e. can be 
chimeric), providing the opportunity for conflict over stalk investment (49, 56). Conflict 
arises because the different strains within an aggregation each contribute to the costs 
for building the stalk, while all members of the aggregation benefit equally. Thus, stalk 
investment in D. discoideum fits the scenario modelled by the Collective Investment 
game. In our direct fitness accounting, different strains are the relevant fitness-
maximizing strategists, with the proportion of cells sacrificed by the strain to build the 
stalk representing their investment into the public good, and their relative frequency 
within the aggregation determining their relatedness to the group (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, D. discoideum provides an ideal model social system to experimentally 
test the predictions made by the Collective Investment game because group 
composition can be manipulated and corresponding patterns of investment can be 
measured quantitatively (49). Specifically, the ESS of the Collective Investment game 
predicts that D. discoideum strains should show relatedness-dependent patterns of 
investment, meaning that their investment should change as a function of their 
frequency in a group. When a strain is at low frequency in the aggregation they would 
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be predicted to invest little or nothing into the stalk (hence produce mostly spores), 
while a strain that is at a high frequency in an aggregation should invest at a level that 
is close to their clonal investment (Figure 2A and 2D). This pattern of investment 
results in a return on investment, and hence relative fitness, that is highest when a 
strain is at low frequency in an aggregation and hence has low relatedness (because 
it exploits its partner as a free rider) and is lowest when it is at high frequency and 
hence has high relatedness (because it pays the cost of being exploited). 
Consequently, the expected relative fitness of the lower-frequency player is always 
higher than that of the higher-frequency player (Figure 2B and 2E).  
To test these predictions, we measured the behavior of co-occurring natural D. 
discoideum strains in clonal and chimeric development. We examined the fit to 
theoretical predictions using data from ten naturally co-occurring strains, which 
represent the spectrum of genetic diversity within a natural population (58), interacting 
in 34 different chimeric pairings. To vary levels of relatedness we combined pairs of 
strains across a range of frequencies (at least five different frequencies per replicate, 
for a total of 944 chimeric combinations). On average, strains show patterns of 
frequency-dependent investment in the stalk in pairwise mixes that match the 
qualitative predictions of the ESS in the Collective Investment game (compare Figure 
4A with 4D, see also expected values in Figures 2A, 2D, and 3A). Strains invest little 
into the stalk when their relative frequency in a group is low and much more when their 
relative frequency is high (χ2(3) = 181.5, p < 10‒38, see also Figures S5A and S5B for 
high resolution illustrations of patterns from two pairings). Overall, the pattern very 
closely corresponds to the quantitative predictions of the model (Figure 4A and 4D). 
Strains approach zero investment when they are at a very low frequency in a group, 
whereas their investment is close to the optimal level of investment (assumed to be 
about 30% of their cells into stalk) when their frequency in a group approaches 100%. 
This pattern of investment leads to the pattern of frequency dependent relative fitness 
predicted by the Collective Investment game (Figure 2B, 2E, and 3B) in which strains 
have a high relative fitness when they are at a low frequency in a group and low relative 
fitness when they are at high frequency (χ2(3) = 348, p < 10‒75; compare the illustration 
of expected values in Figure 4B with the experimental results in Figure 4E, see also 
Figures S5C and S5D). Importantly, these results imply that all strains will appear to 
behave as ‘cheaters’ when at low frequency in groups and as ‘cooperators’ when at 
high frequency.  
 The predictions of the Collective Investment game can also be viewed from the 
perspective of the aggregate behavior of the strains in terms of total collective 
investment. Experimental measurements of total collective investment as a function of 
the relative frequencies of strains shows the predicted pattern of relative investment 
in stalk across frequencies in a group (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C), where investment is 
lowest when strains are at the same frequency, and increases exponentially as the 
difference in their frequencies increases (i.e. as frequency of the focal strain 
approaches zero or one) (χ2(2) = 144.3, p < 10‒32; compare the illustration of expected 
patterns in Figure 4C with empirical results in Figure 4F, see also S5E and S5F).  
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Figure 4. Patterns of stalk investment, relative fitness, and collective investment as a function of strain frequencies in 
chimeric aggregations. Parts A-C illustrate expected patterns (see Figure 3) under parameter values that resemble the 
empirical results (using the same equations [eqns. 11 to 13] to calculate model expectations as those used for empirical 
estimation), with the bold line corresponding to the case where Θୋ=0.3,  = 2, and with the shading spanning a 
range of error in measurement of frequency (relatedness) ( = 0.25 to  = 0.75). Parts D-F show empirical results from the 
set of 34 chimeric pairs (N=944 total chimeric mixes), with the points representing the means and the bars their standard 
errors, estimated from a mixed model (following the model structure in the Methods, but with frequency as a categorical 
factor). D) Individual stalk investment by a focal strain as a function of its frequency in a chimeric aggregation., E) Relative 
fitness for a focal strain as a function of its frequency in a chimeric aggregation, F) Collective investment by chimeras as a 
function of the frequency of a randomly assigned focal strain to the chimeric aggregation. In parts D and E the bold curve 
represents the best-fit estimate from the cubic regression model (here fitted to the estimated means). For part F, the curve 
represents the best-fit estimated from a quadratic regression model (fitted to the estimated means). For all three figures 
(parts D to F) the shaded region indicates a one standard error interval on either side of the best-fit line. For individual 
(parts A and D) and collective (parts C and F) investment values were re-scaled by subtracting 1 െ Θୋ from the raw measures, under the assumption that Θୋ ൌ 0.3 (therefore, the value labelled as Θୋ corresponds to a value of 0.3 in the figure). 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and How to Avoid It  
Although the ESS is characterized by continuously variable relatedness-
dependent (or frequency-dependent) behavior (Figure 2), to achieve a more intuitive 
understanding we can link the payoff structure at any particular group composition to 
canonical games. To do so, at a given group composition we can compare the relative 
payoffs to a player that defects by making no contribution and the relative payoffs to a 
player that cooperates by making a contribution (see Methods). We consider a 
scenario to be akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma when defection is the best strategy for 
both players, regardless of the opponent’s strategy. In the Snowdrift game, we expect 
players to adopt opposite roles, with one cooperating and the other defecting. 
Therefore, we consider two different scenarios to be akin to the Snowdrift game. The 
first scenario follows the structure of the classic symmetrical game, where players are  
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better off defecting against a cooperator 
and cooperating against a defector. The 
second scenario occurs when there is 
an asymmetry between players that 
dictates their roles in the Snowdrift 
game, with one player doing best by 
cooperating while the other does best 
by defecting.  
The exact nature of payoffs 
depend on the model parameters, but in 
general, when the players’ differ widely 
in their relatedness to the group, we find 
that the pattern of joint payoffs are akin 
to the Snowdrift game and when they 
have similar levels of relatedness to the 
group it is akin to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (12, 23) (Figure 5). Under the 
Snowdrift game, one player adopts the 
role as the cooperator and the other as 
the defector, which results in relatively 
high fitness for the group. By adopting 
different roles, the defector receives a 
higher payoff than the cooperator, but 
the cooperator is willing to adopt that 
role because it is better off cooperating 
than defecting when its opponent 
defects (23). In the context of the 
Collective Investment game, it is the asymmetry in relatedness to the group that drives 
the players to adopt the two roles (Figure 5), with the player that is more related to the 
group acting as the cooperator while its opponent is able to defect (Figure 2A, 2D and 
3A), leading to a higher relative payoff to the defector (Figure 2B, 2E and 3B). In 
contrast, under the Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions (Figure 5), both players do best by 
defecting, which leads to low collective investment (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C). These 
game scenarios help explain the pattern of collective investment in stalk that we 
observe in the D. discoideum system (Figure 4F): under the Snowdrift game conditions 
we see collective investment approach the level seen in clonal development (which 
presumably evolved to maximize group fitness), whereas under the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma conditions we see underinvestment. 
 We expect the predicted collective underinvestment under the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma conditions to be detrimental compared to the higher investment under 
Snowdrift conditions. We tested this by measuring the proportion of fruiting bodies that 
collapsed due to inadequate investment in the stalk. Fruiting bodies made by chimeric 
mixtures (using all pair-wise 50:50 mixes of ten natural strains) were found to have 
Figure 5. Payoff structure of the Collective Investment game 
and relationship to classic games. Payoffs are characterized in 
terms of whether defection or investment is favored, or 
whether the best strategy depends on the investment by the 
opponent (labeled as ‘Conflict’). The best strategy for the 
focal player is shown in red and that of their opponent in blue. 
When both players do best by defecting the overall payoff 
structure is akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we see low 
levels of total investment (see Figure 2). When one player 
does best by investing while its opponent does best by 
defecting the overall payoff structure is akin to an asymmetric 
Snowdrift game, where the difference in relatedness 
determines which player takes the role as the cooperator (with 
the player with higher relatedness making the investment in 
cooperation). Bridging these two regions is a zone of conflict. 
The bold lines correspond to a level of investment of ଵଶ Θୋ, 
with the shaded region spanning the range from ଵସ Θୋ to 
ଷ
ସ Θୋ. The shaded region illustrates that the zones corresponding to 
the different games will depend on how much an individual 
invests when cooperating.
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spontaneously collapsed more often than those made by clonal groups (12% versus 
1.1%, F(1,52.3) = 10.4, p = 0.002). Furthermore, we expect the stability of fruiting bodies 
to reflect the overall level of collective investment in stalk, which should be manifested 
as an inverse relationship between the level of collective investment (Figure 4F) and 
the probability of fruiting body collapse. We tested this prediction using data from four 
pairs of strains measured at seven frequencies and find the expected negative 
correlation between collective investment for a given pair and probability of their 
fruiting bodies collapsing (r = −0.94, p = 0.0009). This relationship between investment 
and fruiting body stability underlies a strongly frequency (and hence relatedness) 
dependent risk of fruiting body collapse, with risk of collapse peaking when is there is 
no asymmetry in the frequency of the strains (i.e. both strains at a frequency of 0.5) 
and declining exponentially as the difference in frequencies increases (i.e. on either 
size of a frequency of 0.5) (χ2(4) = 403, p < 10‒86; Figure 6A, Figures S6 and S7). If we 
use fruiting body stability (which is simply 1 minus the probability of fruiting body  
collapse) as a proxy for the 
dispersal success of a group 
(ϕௗ௜௦௣௘௥௦௔௟ሺீሻ) and the estimates 
for individual stalk investment 
(see Figure 4D) to estimate 
fitness through spores (as 
simply 1 minus the proportion of 
cells invested in stalk; see eqn. 
1), we can generate an 
approximate pattern of 
individual fitness (see eqn. 3). 
Despite the fact  
that our lab-based measure of 
fruiting body stability provides 
only a rough approximation for 
group fitness through dispersal, 
we find that the pattern of 
individual fitness closely 
matches the pattern expected 
under the Collective Investment game (SI Appendix, Figure S2C and S2D). The 
resulting fitness pattern illustrates that individuals will have the lowest possible fitness 
when at intermediate frequencies and, while individuals always do best at very low 
frequency in a group, individual fitness increases towards both frequency extremes.  
The finding that individuals suffer a much larger cost from conflict when trapped 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions at intermediate levels of relatedness (Figure 
5 and 6A) raises the question of why strains would engage in cooperative fruiting body 
formation under these conditions. Indeed, widespread (imperfect) strain segregation 
is a known mechanism in D. discoideum for avoiding chimerism when strains are 
Figure 6. Empirical measures of fruiting body stability and segregation 
behavior. A) The proportion of fruiting bodies that spontaneously 
collapsed as a function of the frequency of the focal strain in each mix 
(estimated from six chimeric pairings; N=324). B) The relative degree of 
segregation as a function of the frequency of the designated focal strain. 
Measurements are from three different chimeric pairings across the nine 
frequencies (N=692 total sporeheads, with an average of 25.6 sporeheads 
measured for each pair at each frequency). In both figures, the points 
represent the means and the bars their standard errors, estimated from a 
mixed model (following the model structure in the Methods, but with 
frequency as a categorical factor). For part A, the curve gives the best fit 
cubic relationship while for part B the curve gives the best fit quadratic 
relationship (with the shaded region indicating a one standard error range 
on either side of the curve).
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mixed at equal frequencies and developed on a natural soil substrate (59, 60), with 
two rapidly evolving genes being thought to be principally responsible (58, 59). 
Although the mechanism by which these genes regulate segregation remains to be 
fully elucidated, there is evidence to suggest that a critical mass of self-self-
interactions are required for the coordinated directional motility that is necessary to 
form independent cooperating groups (61). We might, therefore, expect strains to only 
show segregation when faced with Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions (i.e. low 
asymmetry in relatedness), while remaining in aggregations when in Snowdrift-like 
conditions of high asymmetry in levels of relatedness. Indeed, as predicted, we find 
that segregation is highest when there is little asymmetry in frequencies (relatedness) 
and declines exponentially as the difference in frequencies increases (χ2(2) = 19, p < 
10‒4; Figure 6B). The frequency-dependent nature of segregation suggests that it may 
not have evolved as a mechanism of ‘cheater avoidance’, as has previously been 
suggested (58–60), but rather, as a mechanism for reshaping group composition to 
generate asymmetry in relative frequencies (resulting in a scenario where there will 
typically be a strain with high relatedness to the group), thereby avoiding the 
pernicious Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions and entering into the more favorable 
Snowdrift-like conditions.  
 
The Logic of Collective Investment 
The Collective Investment game and the supporting empirical data from the D. 
discoideum system have broad implications for our understanding of cooperative 
behavior. From the perspective of kin selection theory, an individual’s relatedness to 
the group governs whether the personal cost of contributing to public goods are 
outweighed by the benefit. Consequently, if individuals can measure their relatedness 
to group-mates, we would expect to see them invest in a way that maximizes inclusive 
fitness in terms of the balance between the benefit to kin in relation to the costs to self 
(following Hamilton’s rule in the context of the ESS, which means that the optimal 
strategy depends on the behavior of opponents). Applying this logic to the D. 
discoideum system, an individual cell should modulate its ‘willingness’ to differentiate 
into a stalk cell based on its measurement of relatedness to other members of its 
aggregation, with the actual level of investment being determined by the benefits of 
producing a stalk relative to the cost of diminished spore production. From an 
economics perspective, we can view players as investors in some collective venture 
who are out to maximize return on investment, with relatedness representing their level 
of ‘stake’ or ‘ownership’ in the venture. When a player has a low relatedness to the 
group, their personal investment can have little effect on the overall performance of 
the venture (regardless of how much they invest), so they are better off withholding 
their investment. In contrast, when a player has high relatedness to the group their 
investment can have a large impact on the performance of the venture. Therefore, 
they should be willing to invest more heavily. In the context of the D. discoideum 
system, this perspective logically implies that a strain at a low frequency in an 
aggregation cannot impact the performance of the fruiting body regardless of how 
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much it invests into stalk, and hence that strain should withhold their investment. 
Finally, we can view the scenario from the perspective of a dynamic game, with 
individuals as players out to maximize their payoff. From this perspective, a player 
contributes to the public good because they directly benefit from their own contribution 
and the optimal strategy is determined by the benefit they receive in relation to the 
cost paid (see Figure 1A). Players with low representation in the group do not 
contribute much to the public good because their contribution is diluted by the group, 
so they receive back only a small fraction of what they invest. In contrast, a player with 
high representation in the group should invest more because they receive back most 
of the benefit, and consequently they are mostly helping themselves through 
production of the public good. In the context of the D. discoideum system, this 
perspective implies that a strain with a high frequency in an aggregation should 
contribute heavily to stalk production because most of the benefit goes to their own 
spores, and lower investment would only hurt them. The result is that a strain with a 
lower frequency, who would see little return on their contribution, can be exploitative 
since it is in the best interests of a common strain to build a stalk to their own benefit.  
 Although these different perspectives suggest different logical explanations for 
why and how individuals should invest in public goods, they are ultimately 
interchangeable since all are based on the same underlying framework. All suggest 
that organisms should adopt dynamic strategies in which they modulate their 
contribution to cooperation through public goods in relation to their relatedness to the 
group. Furthermore, it suggests that approaches where organisms are simply 
classified as ‘cooperators’ and ‘cheaters’ (11, 12, 62) will often fail to capture the true 
nature of cooperative behavior in many systems. Indeed, the same individual or 
genotype could be expected to be cooperative or exploitative depending on their 
relatedness to the group. This scenario is clearly realized in the D. discoideum system. 
Although strains have typically been viewed as cooperators and cheaters (49, 63–65), 
the striking fit of the observed investment behavior by natural strains to the predictions 
of the Collective Investment game (Figure 4) provides strong evidence they 
cooperative through the implementation of a dynamic frequency-dependent strategy. 
As a result, all strains can appear as cheaters when they are at a relatively low 
frequency in a group and as cooperators when they are at a relatively high frequency. 
Our finding that even simple organisms like a social amoeba can implement the sorts 
of savvy relatedness-dependent investment suggests that these dynamic adaptive 
strategies may be common in nature. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The Collective Investment Game 
The Collective Investment game is a two-player game in which each individual 
makes an investment into a public good and receives a payoff as a function of their 
own investment and the collective investment of the pair. The structure of the game is 
related to economic games of public goods (4, 7), but differs in that the return on 
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investment is a function of a player’s relatedness to the group. The game is described 
with reference to the Dictyostelium discoideum system but the basic structure is easily 
adapted for other systems. The players are different genotypes (strains), but in 
principle can represent any evolutionarily-relevant fitness-maximizing agent. Within an 
aggregation (which represents the group or collective) strains may have varying 
relative frequencies or proportions (݌௜). The frequency of a strain in a group is 
equivalent to whole-group relatedness since it represents the average relatedness of 
a randomly selected cell to the entire group (self-included) (20, 21). We present the 
model results and insights with regard to relatedness in keeping with theory but 
discuss the results in the context of frequencies of strains within a group to provide a 
clear link to the experimental methods.  
Strains invest a proportion of their cells into stalk (ܫ௜∣݌݅) and the rest (1 െ ܫ௜∣݌݅) 
into spores (with the level of investment potentially depending on their proportion, ݌௜). 
Therefore, their level of investment represents the proportion of their entire ‘budget’ of 
cells that are allocated towards stalk production (hence 0 ≥ ܫ௜∣݌݅ ≤ 1). Investment into 
stalk is costly because it reduces the total number of spores a strain can produce and 
hence the ‘payoff’ (component of fitness) to a strain through spores declines (at a rate 
of ߛ௦) as a function of their investment in stalk (see Figure 1A): 
 
߶௦௣௢௥௘௦ሺ௜ሻ ൌ 1 െ ߛݏܫ௜∣݌݅         (1) 
 
The payoff is scaled to a value of 1 when no cells are invested into stalk.  
Strains presumably invest in building a stalk to facilitate dispersal of spores (49, 
50, 56). While the cost of investing into the stalk is paid by the individual strain from 
their total budget of cells, the benefit (payoff) gained from dispersal depends on the 
architecture of the fruiting body, and hence on collective investment into the stalk 
(which is simply the weighted average of the stalk allocation of the two players, ீܫ ൌ
∑ ܫ௜∣݌݅݌௜). We model the performance of the fruiting body for spore dispersal as an 
increasing function of collective investment: 
 
߶ௗ௜௦௣௘௥௦௔௟ሺீሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ߛ݀ܫܩ         (2) 
 
where ߛௗ gives the rate at which the payoff through dispersal increases as a function 
of investment into stalk (Figure 1A). As with the payoff through spores (eqn. 1), the 
payoff through dispersal is scaled to a value of 1 when no investment is made. For 
both payoff functions (eqns. 1 and 2) the qualitative results do not depend on this 
scaling, so the baseline value of 1 is used in both cases for simplicity. Similar 
cost/benefit relationships underlie a wide array of models that consider tradeoffs, such 
as models for the evolution of life-histories (e.g., models of clutch size and parental 
investment). For example, models for the evolution of parental investment assume 
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increasing investment per offspring is costly because it reduces fecundity, but 
beneficial because it increases offspring survival. Although, like many of these models, 
we assume a linear relationship between investment and costs/benefits, the qualitative 
results are robust across an array of relationships (so long as costs and benefits both 
increase with investment).  
The overall success of a strain is determined by its payoff through spores 
weighted by the overall performance of the fruiting body. This is consistent with 
evolutionary theory, such as models that consider trade-offs between components of 
fitness or episodes of selection, and is necessary to properly account for the influence 
of multiple factors affecting fitness. For example, to calculate total parental fitness in 
models for the evolution of parental investment, it is necessary to multiply an 
individual’s fecundity (number of offspring produced) by the expected survival of the 
progeny they produce (since the product represents the number of surviving offspring). 
In terms of the D. discoideum system, the expected success of each spore depends 
on its expected dispersal, and hence fitness of a strain is the product of spore number 
and spore dispersal: 
 
ω௜ ൌ ϕ௦௣௢௥௘௦ሺ௜ሻϕௗ௜௦௣௘௥௦௔௟ሺீሻ         (3) 
 
The overall success of a group is simply the average fitness of its members (eqn. 3), 
߱ீ ൌ ∑߱௜݌௜ which is equivalent to the expected payoff for the group through spores 
weighted by the payoff through dispersal, ߱ ீ ൌ ϕ௦௣௢௥௘௦ሺீሻϕௗ௜௦௣௘௥௦௔௟ሺீሻ (where the group 
payoff through spores is the weighted average of the spore production by group 
members, ϕ௦௣௢௥௘௦ሺீሻ ൌ ∑ϕ௦௣௢௥௘௦ሺ௜ሻ݌௜). The trade-off between spore production and 
spore dispersal reflected in the payoffs (eqns. 1 and 2, see Figure 1A) results in a 
quadratic relationship between collective investment and group success (Figure 1B). 
From this relationship, we can derive the level of collective investment (ீܫ ) that 
maximizes group success (ீܫ ൌ Θୋ), which represents the most efficient (welfare 
optimal) allocation of cells to stalk and spores that is possible given the costs and 
benefits of stalk investment: 
 
Θୋ ൌ ቊ
ଵ
ଶ ቀ
ଵ
ఊೞ െ
ଵ
ఊ೏ቁ , if ቀ
ଵ
ఊೞ െ
ଵ
ఊ೏ቁ ൐ 0
0, otherwise
        (4) 
 
where the condition insures that investment is non-negative. Therefore, the optimal 
level of investment into stalk (in terms of group success) is determined by the relative 
importance of payoffs through spores versus through dispersal. Consequently, under 
any conditions where the benefits of dispersal outweigh the cost to spore production, 
the collective will have highest overall success at some intermediate level of 
investment into stalk. Because aggregations of D. discoideum invest into stalk while 
also producing spores, the pattern of payoffs in nature must result in such an 
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intermediate optimum. The strength of selection on fruiting body architecture (Γ) is 
given by the rate at which group success declines as the level of investment deviates 
from the group optimum: 
 
Γ ൌ െߛ௦ߛௗ            (5) 
 
The value of Γ represents the curvature of the relationship between collective 
investment and group success (i.e., it is the quadratic coefficient for the parabolic 
relationship between collective investment and group success; see Figure 1B). 
While equation (4) represents the optimal investment into stalk for a group, 
individual players (strains) within a group should invest in a way that maximizes their 
expected individual fitness (eqn. 3). The optimal level of investment for a given player 
(a strain) is a function of their relatedness to (i.e., frequency in) their group: 
 
 Θ௜ ൌ ൝
ଵ
ଶ ൬
ଵ
ఊೞ െ
ଵ
ఊ೏௣೔ െ
ூೕ∣݌݆௣ೕ
௣೔ ൰ , if ൬
ଵ
ఊೞ െ
ଵ
ఊ೏௣೔ െ
ூೕ∣݌݆௣ೕ
௣೔ ൰ ൐ 0
0, otherwise
      (6) 
 
Logically, the optimal level of individual investment corresponds to the value that 
maximizes group success (eqn. 4) when a strain is clonal (݌௜ ൌ 1). At all other 
frequencies, the optimal level of investment will be lower than the value that maximizes 
group success (since 0 ≥ܫ௝∣݌݆ ≤ 1 and 0 > ݌௜ < 1). The level of investment given by 
equation (6) represent the ESS for a strain, but because the optimal level of investment 
by each strain depends on the level of investment by other strains, the actual level of 
investment will depend on the joint resolution of that interdependence. As a result of 
this interdependence, the constraints on the range of investment values (0 ≥ ܫ௜∣݌݅ ≤ 1), 
and the constraints on the range of frequencies (0 ≥ ݌௜ ≤ 1), we use numerical solutions 
from equation (6) to illustrate the patterns of the ESS under different conditions (see 
below).  
To understand the properties of the ESS consider the case where other strains 
make no investment, such that the ESS is simply ଵଶ ሺ1 ߛ௦⁄ െ 1 ߛௗ݌௜⁄ ሻ (or zero when the 
term is negative). This level of investment represents the most economically ‘efficient’ 
strategy for a strain. Under these conditions, when the optimal strategy is to make a 
non-zero stalk investment, the two terms in parentheses must be greater than zero, 
with the first term (1 ߛ௦⁄ ) representing the reciprocal of the cost of investing and the 
second term (1 ߛௗ݌௜⁄ ) the reciprocal of the benefit of investing. Thus, at the optimal 
payoff ݌௜ߛௗ ൐ ߛ௦, which is a form of Hamilton’s rule (19, 66), the kin selection benefits 
(݌௜ߛௗ) must outweigh the costs (ߛ௦). The third term in parentheses (ܫ௝∣݌݆݌௝ ݌௜⁄ ) reflects 
the dispersal benefit to the focal strain arising from investment into stalk made by other 
strains, with the numerator (ܫ௝∣݌݆݌௝) representing the total investment made by others. 
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The ESS deviates from the most efficient strategy because any investment made by 
other strains increases the value of the focal strain’s spores, and hence increases the 
cost of making their own investment. This term can be viewed from an economic 
perspective as an ‘opportunity cost’, where a strain has the opportunity to gain from 
the dispersal benefit provided by the investment made by others and loses that 
opportunity when those spores are sacrificed to invest into stalk. The kin selection 
consequences of this opportunity cost can be seen by examining the conditions where 
the ESS level of investment is non-zero, which correspond to ݌௜ߛௗ ൐ ߛ௦ ቀ1 ൅ ߛௗܫ௝∣݌݆݌௝ቁ. 
Consequently, if we view these conditions as a form of Hamilton’s rule, we can see 
that the dispersal benefit to kin from investing has to overcome both the direct cost 
from making an investment and the additional cost arising from the missed opportunity 
to exploit investments made by others.  
We can also view the cost of investment into stalk in terms of its effect on the 
representation of a strain in the sporehead of their group (݌′݅), which defines their 
within-group fitness. Their representation is determined by their investment in stalk 
relative to the overall investment made by the group: ݌௜ᇱ ൌ ݌௜ ቀ1 െ ܫ௜∣݌݅ 1 െ ீܫ⁄ ቁ. The 
within-group fitness can be calculated as a strain’s representation in the sporehead 
relative to its frequency in the group: ෝ߱௜ ൌ ݌௜ᇱ ݌௜⁄ , making the relative (within-group) 
fitness of a strain (ߩ௜ ൌ ෝ߱௜ ෝ߱௝⁄ ): 
 
ߩ௜ ൌ ଵିூ೔∣݌݅ଵିூೕ∣݌݆           (7) 
 
Therefore, relative fitness within a group is a direct function of the relative investment 
made by strains. The pattern of relative fitness within a group is similar to the pattern 
of relative absolute fitness (߱݅ ݆߱⁄ ), which is simply ቀሾ1 െ ߛ௦ܫ௜∣݌݅ሿ ሾ1 െ ߛ௦ܫ௝∣݌݆ൗ ሿቁ. 
 
The Nature of the Game 
To understand the properties of the ESS we can characterize the payoffs to 
players in relation to the payoff structures of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift 
games (23). This analysis allows us to relate the game’s properties to the intuitive 
framework of existing well-understood models. However, to achieve this goal we need 
to first address the fact that the Investment Game differs from the canonical games in 
three key aspects. Firstly, the Investment Game differs in that expected payoffs vary 
as a function of relatedness, so there is no single payoff matrix, but rather, a 
relatedness-dependent payoff function. Therefore, we need to evaluate the properties 
of the game across levels of relatedness, which allows us to understand how the 
properties of the game change as a player’s relatedness to the group changes. 
Secondly, when the opposing players differ in their relatedness to the group, they will 
also differ in their expected payoffs. Therefore, we need to consider a separate payoff 
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matrix for each player at each level of relatedness. Finally, because investment into 
public goods can vary quantitatively, the game does not have discrete strategies that 
correspond to fixed alternative strategies like ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. There are several 
logical alternative ways to consider cooperation versus defection and the type of game 
that a scenario corresponds to necessarily depends on the level of investment being 
made by a ‘cooperator’. The higher the investment made by a cooperator the higher 
the rewards for defection, which changes the optimal response (see eqn. 6). 
Therefore, we use a simple framework where we consider defection as the case where 
individuals make no contribution to the public goods and cooperation as the case 
where individuals make some non-zero contribution (the size of which we vary in our 
analysis of the game).  
The game scenario depends on payoffs to a player in terms of their expected 
fitness (߱௜, eqn. 3) under four scenarios (stating the focal player’s strategy first): 
cooperate against a cooperator (CiCj), cooperate against a defector (CiDj), defect 
against a cooperator (DiCj), or defect against a defector (DiDj). Because we are 
primarily interested in how payoffs lead to ‘motivation’ for a player to invest or defect, 
we consider ‘weak’ forms of the games rather than the overall structure of the payoff 
matrices. That is, we consider whether a player’s fitness is increased or decreased by 
making a contribution to public goods when their opponent either cooperates (makes 
a contribution) or defects (withholds their contribution). Payoffs are classified as being 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-like when a player is better off defecting regardless of the strategy 
of their opponent (DiCj > CiCj and DiDj > CiDj) and Snowdrift like when they are better 
off defecting against a cooperator and cooperating against a defector (DiCj > CiCj and 
CiDj > DiDj). If a player is better off cooperating regardless of the strategy of their 
opponent (CiCj > DiCj and CiDj > DiDj) we consider their strategy as selfish investment, 
meaning they are favored to cooperate because it is in their own selfish interests 
regardless of what their opponent does.  
Both players can ‘agree’ on the game being played or, because of the 
asymmetry in payoffs, they can disagree. When both agree that the game is Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or Snowdrift we classify the scenario as the agreed game. Disagreement 
over the game being played generally arises when one player views the scenario as 
favoring selfish investment, while the other sees the scenario as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
This scenario is analogous to the ESS for an asymmetrical Snowdrift game, with one 
player getting a payoff for cooperating with a defector and the other getting the payoff 
for defecting against a cooperator. In this case, the asymmetry in relatedness 
determines which player will take the role as cooperator and which as defector (with 
the higher relatedness player being the cooperator). Hence, we describe this scenario 
as being like an asymmetrical Snowdrift game.  
 
Imperfect Information 
 The derivation of the Investment Game implicitly assumes that players (strains) 
have perfect information about their relatedness to the group and can therefore adjust 
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their investment accordingly. In the context of D. discoideum, ‘information’ is the output 
of any mechanism that provide feedback to cells that reflects their frequency in a 
group, and hence can potentially arise from many molecular mechanisms. Of course, 
if the players have no information about their relatedness we would not expect to see 
any relatedness-dependent changes in stalk investment, so any frequency dependent 
change in behavior must correspond to some information (regardless of whether it is 
actively or passively acquired). Presumably any molecular mechanism or responses 
to information should have some degree of noise, resulting in random error in the 
measurement of relatedness. In the D. discoideum system, random noise could simply 
represent the variation from cell to cell in their measurement of their frequency, so the 
entire group of cells from a strain measures their frequency with some noise. The 
mean of their measurement could be accurate, but the individual cells would respond 
as if they were at a different frequency, making the response deviate from the perfect 
information case. 
 We modelled error using a Gaussian probability density function (PDF), where 
the mean of the PDF represents the true frequency (relatedness) of the strain and the 
standard deviation the level of noisiness (see SI Appendix, Figure S2). We assume 
that measurement error depends on the complexity of group composition, so the 
magnitude of the error (i.e., the standard deviation of the PDF) was weighted by 4݌ଵ݌ଶ 
(which has a maximum value of 1 when ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ and declines to zero as either strain 
nears a frequency of 1). Logically, this implies that strains are much more able to 
measure their frequency (relatedness) when they are at extreme frequencies than 
when they are at intermediate frequencies in a group. For example, a strain would be 
better able to distinguish between a true frequency of 0.01 and 0.21 than it would be 
able to distinguish between 0.4 and 0.6. Analyses were integrated over all possible 
frequencies (from zero to one), with the probability that a strain behaves as if it has a 
particular frequency being given by the PDF weighted by the group complexity term. 
Because each player assesses their own frequency, analyses at a given frequency 
require integration over all possible pairwise frequencies.  
 
Model Predictions 
To generate predictions for collective investment in D. discoideum, we varied 
the relative cost to spore production (ߛ௦) and benefit from dispersal (ߛௗ) from stalk 
investment to alter the strength of selection on fruiting body architecture (eqn. 5). For 
most illustrations in the main text we restricted the parameters to values that result in 
an optimal level of clonal investment of 30% of cells to the stalk, which corresponds to 
the approximate pattern observed in naturally derived strains (54, 55). However, in 
Figures 2D, 2E and 2F, we hold the strength of selection constant (at Γ ൌ 2) and vary 
the optimal level of clonal investment to illustrate the impact of different optima. We 
illustrate a much wider range of parameter space in SI Appendix, Figure S1, varying 
both the strength of selection and the clonal investment optimum systematically across 
panels. Within the range of values that keep fitness non-negative, the strength of 
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selection on allocation of cells and the clonal investment optimum (which are both 
determined by the values of ߛ௦ and ߛௗ, see eqns. 4 and 5) do not change the qualitative 
predictions of the model.  
 At each frequency (relatedness) we solved the ESS level of investment (eqn. 
6) for the two players. Exact solutions were generated using the Solve function in 
Mathematica 10.0 (Wolfram Research, Inc.). Given the ESS level of investment, we 
calculated absolute and relative (within-group) fitness of each player and the level of 
collective investment. We also analyzed the game scenarios under each scenario to 
link these patterns to the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To link 
the model results to the experimental data we also calculated individual and collective 
investment following the methods used in the experimental work (where all measures 
are based on spore counts and representation in chimeric sporeheads, see below).  
 
Measurement of Spore Allocation 
We followed well-established D. discoideum protocols (29, 48, 54), which are 
therefore only briefly outlined here. We used a set of ten naturally co-occurring strains 
of D. discoideum from Little Butt’s Gap, North Carolina (NC28.1, NC34.2, NC52.3, 
NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 and NC105.1) that have 
previously been used in several studies of social interactions (29, 57, 58). All strains 
were grown on SM plates with Klebsiella aerogenes as a food source. Before 
aggregation, cells were harvested and washed of bacteria by repeated centrifugation 
in KK2 (16.1mM KH2PO4, 3.7mM K2HPO4). To construct experimental chimeras, we 
reciprocally mixed cells from a strain that was fluorescently labelled with 10 mM 
CellTracker™ Green CMFDA dye with an unlabelled partner treated with DMSO to 
control for any effect of labelling. Clonal sets of labelled and unlabelled cells were also 
created to provide a measure of any counting bias. Cell mixes were plated for 
development on 1.5% KK2 purified agar plates (surface area ~21.3 cm2), at a density 
of 4.7x105 cell/cm2. Relative proportional representation of the focal strain in the 
sporehead was primarily determined by counting the percentage of fluorescent spores 
using flow cytometry. However, for some sets of replicates from two pairs 
(NC28.1+NC63.2 and NC34.2+NC105.1) measurements were done by microscopy 
(with spores washed into 5ml spore buffer and imaged using a fluorescence imaging 
system). Despite the fact that two different methodologies were used to measure 
relative spore number, the patterns of relative representation in the sporehead were 
indistinguishable. Because of technical limitations associated with the labelling 
process, an average of 0.3% (s.d. = 0. 09%) of unlabelled spores are counted as being 
labelled and an average of 1.4% (s.d. = 0. 9%) of labelled spores are counted as being 
unlabelled (based on data from clonal populations of labelled and unlabelled). 
Therefore, to correct for any potential counting bias, the raw proportion of labelled (݌௜∗) 
cells of strain i in a chimeric mix with an unlabeled strain j was corrected using the 
proportion of labelled cells measured from clonal sets of labelled (݌௜ሺ஼ሻ∗ ) and unlabelled 
cells (݌௝ሺ஼ሻ) (created using the same pools of cells as in the chimeric mixtures): 
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݌̂௜∗ ൌ ൫݌௜∗ െ ݌௝ሺ஼ሻ൯ ൫݌௜ሺ஼ሻ∗ െ ݌௝ሺ஼ሻ൯ൗ . To count the total number of spores produced by a 
set of fruiting bodies from a given number of cells plated (107 cells/plate), we harvested 
the entire agar discs from the plates into 5mL of spore buffer (20mM EDTA, 0.05% 
NP40) and counted spores using a hemocytometer. 
The ten strains were used to construct 34 different types of chimeric mixtures, 
with each strain used in at least 4 different pairings. Within each pairing, chimeras 
were created in which strains were mixed in seven different input frequency 
combinations (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). For each pair of strains, the 
set of chimeric mixtures across different input frequencies were independently 
replicated at least twice (with an average of 4 replicates per pair) for a total of 944 
chimeric mixtures composed from the 34 pairs across the various input frequencies. 
Two of these strain pairings (NC28.1+NC63.2 and NC34.2+NC105.1) were replicated 
a larger number of times (N=18 and N=15 replicates respectively) to provide higher 
resolution examples. Each experimental replicate therefore provides measurements 
of the relative representation of each strain in the sporehead and the total number of 
spores produced by the pair across different input frequencies. Every experimental 
replicate for a given pair also produced an estimate of the clonal spore production for 
both strains in the pair.  
 
Estimation of Investment and Relative Fitness 
To provide for direct comparison between the model and the experimental data 
we calculated each parameter from the model following the same methods used to 
process the data. Four types of measurements were used to generate an estimate of 
stalk investment of a strain within a chimera (ܫመ௜∣݌ො݅): the total number of spores produced 
by chimeric fruiting bodies composed from strains i and j ( ෠ܶீሺ௜௝ሻ), the total number of 
spores produced by a strain when in clonal fruiting bodies ( ෠ܶ௜), the input proportion of 
a strain within a chimeric mix (݌̂௜), and the output proportion of a strain within chimeric 
sporeheads (݌̂௜ᇱ). From these values we calculated the number of spores from a given 
strain within the chimeric sporeheads as ݌̂௜ᇱ ෠ܶீሺ௜௝ሻ. This measure of spore production 
was normalized against the clonal spore production of the strain to account for any 
inherent differences in numbers of spores produced by different strains (which reflect 
differences in spore size and fixed differences in allocation of cells to spores (29, 57) 
to produce a measure of relative spore production: ෠ܶ௜∣௣ො೔ ൌ ቀ݌ෝ݅′ ෡ܶܩሺ݆݅ሻቁ ൫݌ෝ݅෡ܶ݅൯ൗ . The inverse 
of the relative allocation of cells to spores provides a measure of relative investment 
into stalk: 
 
ܫመ௜∣௣ො೔ ൌ ෠ܶ௜∣௣ො೔ିଵ ൌ ሺ௣ො೔
෠்೔ሻ
൫௣ො೔ᇲ ෠்ಸሺ೔ೕሻ൯
        (11) 
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Therefore, an investment value (ܫመ௜∣݌ො݅) of 1 indicates that a strain allocates the same 
proportion of cells to spores when in a chimera as when clonal. Since we expect the 
allocation pattern of clones to correspond to the optimal pattern, a value of 1 indicates 
that cells in both clones and chimeras are allocating a proportion Θୋ of their cells into 
stalk and 1 െ Θୋ into spores. In the case where strains allocate 100% of their cells to 
spores, the estimate of relative investment (ܫመ௜∣݌ො݅) is expected to simply be the ratio of 
the clonal level of allocation of cells to spores (1 െ Θୋ) to 1 (where 1 is the proportion 
allocated in a chimera). Thus, an investment value corresponding to 1 െ Θୋ is 
equivalent to a pattern of zero investment of cells into stalk. Therefore, when we 
present the patterns of investment we rescale the estimates that are based on relative 
spore production to a scale that reflects relative investment in stalk by simply 
subtracting a value of 1 െ Θୋ. As a result, when strains invest at the clonal level we 
get the expected investment value of Θୋ, and when they allocate all cells to spores 
(i.e., show zero investment) we get a value of 0. When applying this method to the 
analysis of data from the natural strains we use an optimal investment value of 30% 
of cells into the stalk, which is supported by a variety of empirical measurements (54, 
55). The investment for both strains within each chimeric combination within each 
experimental replicate were calculated separately.  
 To calculate relative collective investment for a group (ܫ෠ܩ) we first calculated 
the number of spores we would expect in a chimera given the clonal spore production 
for the pair and their relative frequencies in the chimera: ෠ܶீ∣ୡ୪୭୬ୟ୪ሺ௜௝ሻ ൌ ቀ݌ෝ݅ܶ݅ ൅ ݌ෝ݆݆ܶቁ. 
Collective investment was calculated following equation (4) by dividing this clonal 
expectation by the observed number of spores produced by a chimera: 
 
ܫመீ ൌ ෠்ಸ∣ౙౢ౥౤౗ౢሺ೔ೕሻ෠்ಸሺ೔ೕሻ ൌ
൫௣ො೔்೔ା௣ොೕ்ೕ൯
෠்ಸሺ೔ೕሻ         (12) 
 
Collective investment for each chimeric combination was calculated for each 
experimental replicate using the measures of the component parameters for that 
replicate. As with the measure of individual investment (eqn. 11), the pattern of 
collective investment reflects the relative allocation of cells to spores by strains in a 
chimera compared to the pattern they shown when clonal (but measured for the entire 
group, rather than for the individual strains separately). Hence, the values of collective 
investment calculated using equation (12) have the same scaling as the measure for 
individual investment (eqn. 11). Therefore, we also subtracted a value of 1 െ Θୋ from 
all collective investment values, such that optimal investment (i.e., the clonal pattern) 
corresponds to the expected value of Θୋ and the scenario where the collective 
produces only spores corresponds to a collective investment value of zero. 
Relative fitness within a group follows the definition in the model and simply 
reflects the representation of a strain in the sporehead relative to its input frequency: 
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 ߩො௜∣௝ ൌ ݌̂௜ᇱ ݌̂௜⁄           (13) 
 
For simplicity, we compare the fitness of strains using the ratio of their relative fitness 
values (e.g., ߩො௜∣௝ ߩො௝∣௜⁄  for strain i relative to j). Values of relative fitness were calculated 
for each individual replicate. To test for any potential bias caused by the experimental 
labeling and methods used to calculate relative fitness, we applied the calculation of 
relative fitness in equation (13) to clonal self-mixes of labeled and unlabeled cells 
across the same set of frequencies. We find no significant frequency-dependent 
pattern of relative fitness in these self-mixes (F1, 195 = 1.65, p = 0.2; see SI Appendix, 
Figure S8). 
Patterns of collective investment, individual investment, and relative fitness 
across frequencies were modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS 
Institute, Cary, NC, USA) fitted by maximum likelihood. For collective investment, 
frequency was modelled as a quadratic fixed effect with experimental replicate as a 
random effect. For individual investment and relative fitness, frequency was modelled 
as a cubic fixed effect. For relative fitness, strain-by-block was included as a random 
grouping variable, while for investment, strain was included as a grouping variable 
(owing to a lack of convergence for a model containing a block or replicate effect). 
Reduced versions of all models were also run without any fixed effects (i.e., with only 
the random effects). Significance was determined by calculating twice the difference 
in the negative log likelihoods of the two models (full model and reduced), which is 
approximately chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom determined by the 
difference in the number of parameters in the models.  
 
Measurement and Analysis of the Cost of Chimerism 
To measure the risk of fruiting body collapse, we collected two sources of data. 
First, we created 50:50 chimeric and clonal mixes of ten strain pairs (NC28.1, NC34.2, 
NC52.3, NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 and NC105.1), with an 
average of 10.4 replicates per chimeric combination (total N = 469) and 13 replicates 
per clone (total N = 130) (which together represent data from 31,026 fruiting bodies). 
Differences between clonal and chimeric mixes were analyzed using a mixed model 
with aggregation type (clonal or chimeric) as a fixed effect and pair as a random effect. 
Model degrees of freedom were determined using the Kenward-Roger approximation, 
which corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for the fixed effect based on the 
structure of the random effect to avoid pseudoreplication. Second, we created chimeric 
mixes across a range of focal strain frequencies (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.90 and 
0.95) for six strain pairs (NC28.1+NC105.1, NC99.1+NC105.1, NC99.1+NC60.1, 
NC34.2.1+NC105.1, NC63.2.1+NC60.1 and NC34.2+NC60.1). Mixes were plated as 
a 10μl droplet onto non-nutrient KK2 agar in a 24-well dish and allowed to develop into 
fruiting bodies. The number of fruiting bodies that had spontaneously collapsed was 
scored as a proportion of the total number of fruiting bodies in the well. Data were 
modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA) 
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fitted by maximum likelihood with frequency modelled as a fixed quadratic effect and 
pair as a random grouping variable. Significance was determined by calculating twice 
the difference in the negative log likelihoods of the two models (see above). 
 
Measurement and Analysis of Segregation 
To measure the degree of segregation between pairs of strains across different 
asymmetry in relatedness, we followed established protocols for measuring 
segregation for pairs at equal frequency and applied these methods to measurements 
across a range of pair-wise frequencies (59, 67). Briefly, cells were labelled with 
CellTracker Green CMFDA (with DMSO used as a control for unlabelled cells) and 
strains were reciprocally mixed at a range of relative frequencies of the labelled strain 
(0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). Mixes were plated as a 10μl droplet on 
~1.25g of sharp horticultural sand (Keith Singleton) wetted with 250μl of KK2 in a 24-
well dish and allowed to develop to form fruiting bodies. Individual fruiting bodies were 
then harvested into spore buffer (KK2 with 20mM EDTA and 0.05% NP40), and the 
proportion of fluorescent to non-flourescent spores in each fruiting body measured by 
flow cytometery. We measured patterns of segregation using three different pairs of 
strains (NC28.1+NC63.2, NC105.1+NC34.2, and NC105.1+NC99.1), with at least 10 
sporeheads measured for each pair at each frequency (for a total of 692 sporeheads 
overall).  
A metric of the degree of segregation was calculated following ref. (58). Briefly, 
this measure is based on the standard deviation of a strain’s proportional 
representation across sporeheads (ݏݐ݀ሺ݌̂௜ᇱሻ) at a given input frequency. If there is no 
segregation, then we would expect all variation in the representation of a strain across 
fruiting bodies (composed from the same proportions of strains) to be due to random 
binomial sampling error, and hence ݏݐ݀ሺ݌̂௜ᇱሻ should be very small given the number of 
spores counted. However, when there is segregation, we expect to see much more 
variation in the representation of a strain across fruiting bodies as strains preferentially 
aggregate with themselves. Because the maximum value of this standard deviation 
depends on the relative frequencies of the strains, it is standardized to the maximum 
possible value, which is determined by the geometric mean of the average 
representation of the two strains across all sporeheads (݌̂పᇱഥ ), which is ඥ݌̂పᇱഥ ሺ1 െ ݌̂పᇱഥ 	ሻ. This 
yields a standardized measure of segregation: 
 
ܵ݁݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௝ ൌ 	 ௦௧ௗሺ௣ො೔
ᇲሻ
ට௣ොഢᇲതതതሺଵି௣ොഢᇲതതത	ሻ
         (14), 
 
which goes from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (the maximum possible degree of segregation, 
which would necessarily correspond to all fruiting bodies being clonal, with the relative 
frequency of each type of clonal fruiting body depending on the relative frequencies of 
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the strains). In the statistical analysis, segregation data were modelled using a 
quadratic model following the approach outlined above for fruiting body collapse.  
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